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1. Overview
The field of administrative law is inextricably bound to two phenomena that trace
their origins to the nineteenth century: the rise of large state bureaucracies designed to
fulfill a complex array of societal needs and the development of liberal democratic norms
of social organization and public authority. Much of administrative law can be
understood as an attempt to work out the tension inherent in these two phenomena: the
recognition that the attainment of public purposes is contingent on a cadre of full-time
employees, paid by the public purse and loyal to the state, and, at the same time, the
belief that public authority is legitimate only if embedded in democratic politics and
liberal societies. To put it more succinctly, these are the objectives, on the one hand, of
neutrality and expertise, and, on the other hand, of democracy and liberal rights.
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The common aspiration of making public administration both capable and
accountable serves as the springboard for the comparative analysis in this chapter. I
begin with a discussion of what, in the law, is taken to be the hallmark of modern
bureaucracy—the legal guarantees of civil service employment—together with national
variations in the professionalization of administration and contemporary efforts to cut
back on civil service guarantees. I then turn to three important types of accountability:
the contestation of administrative action before the courts, the involvement of organized
interests in administrative policymaking, and informal accountability to the general
public through parliamentary ombudsmen and transparency guarantees. These categories
serve as a framework for exploring the similarities and differences that shape
contemporary administrative law systems. The chapter concludes with the increasingly
important phenomenon of the globalization of administrative law and the rapid migration
of administrative principles across legal systems throughout the world, both national and
international. In line with the intellectual purpose of this volume, I have omitted topics
that have traditionally been considered peripheral to the field or that fall at the
intersection with other disciplines, for instance the constitutional powers of the executive
branch over public administration and the empowerment of private groups through selfregulation, and refer the reader to the bibliography at the end of the chapter for guidance.

2. Public Administration
One of the defining elements of bureaucracy is civil service employment: the
selection and promotion of public officials based on merit and insulated from political
influence through tenured employment.1 The legal guarantees of civil service
employment emerged to serve multiple ends: autocratic rulers seeking to consolidate
their authority (Prussia), political elites adapting the instruments of government to the
demands of industrialization and urbanization (Britain), and government reformers intent
on shielding administration from the instability and incompetence of party-patronage
appointments (France and the United States). In Europe, Japan, and North America,
civil service safeguards were introduced over the course of the nineteenth century:
beginning in the 1840s in France, 1870 in Britain, 1873 in Prussia, 1882 in Canada, 1887
in Japan, and 1883 in the United States.

2

Modern civil service laws are designed to render public employees independent of
partisan politics and competent to perform the business of the nation. Some legal
systems go so far as to constitutionalize this ambition, including the Italian Constitution
(Articles 97 and 98) and the German Basic Law (Article 33). The core features of civil
service employment are: (1) life tenure absent grave misconduct; (2) merit-based
recruitment; (3) promotion based on a mixture of seniority and merit (often accompanied
by independent civil service commissions); (4) pay scales and benefits that are more
standardized than in private enterprise; and (5) restrictions on political activity, speech,
and union activities, although these are far less common now than in the past.
Notwithstanding the common impulse to develop a professionalized public
administration, there remain significant differences in the degree to which recruitment is
professional or political. At the top echelons of the bureaucracy, political appointments
are more extensive in the United States than in other countries, on the theory that
electoral winners should have an opportunity to impose a new set of priorities on
government administration through the selection of high-level personnel.2 There are also
significant differences in the extent of patronage appointments at the lower levels of the
bureaucracy. Some countries appear to be particularly vulnerable to party-based
infiltration of the public administration, notwithstanding a legal commitment to an
independent, professionally competent civil service. Italy represents but one example of
this phenomenon.3 A number of mechanisms, related to the historically weak nature of
party competition, have enabled political parties and party-affiliated trade unions to
circumvent the civil service system and carve out the public administration among
themselves. These mechanisms include the unofficial assignment of government sectors
to certain political parties—for instance, in the past, the Ministry of Agriculture to the
Christian Democrats—and the recruitment of personnel through temporary contracts,
which are then converted into permanent employment by law or government decree.
The past twenty years or so have witnessed a number of challenges to the
traditional model of civil service employment.4 The most important is the wave of New
Public Management reforms that hit most democracies the 1980s. Reformers in this
school have sought to render the public sector more efficient by making the terms of
public sector employment—pay, benefits, and promotion—more flexible and by tying
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them more closely to performance indicators. Even more radically, various service
delivery functions have been taken away from government administration and are now
handled by firms operating in the private sector. The scope of these reforms, however,
varies dramatically. Privatization, for instance, is far less pervasive in Europe than in the
United States, where core state functions such as running prisons and conducting military
operations have been out-sourced to private contractors.5

3. Administration and the Courts
3.1. Systems of judicial review
With the emergence of bureaucratic power in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries came the question of justice. What was to be the relationship between the old
mode of exercising public authority, through trials and courts, and this new form of state
power, designed to expeditiously raise taxes, undertake public works, protect public
health, and more? The right to contest administrative decisions in a trial-like proceeding
before a state official removed from the original determination emerged in both civil law
and common law systems as critical to the legitimacy of administrative authority. At the
same time, what is generally understood to be the major difference between
administrative law systems also took shape: jurisdiction vested in the ordinary courts in
England versus litigation before specialized state officials connected to the executive
branch in France.
The origins of the common law-droit administratif divide are extremely complex
and have been the object of numerous distinguished studies.6 For our purposes, it is
enough to recall the very different historical circumstances surrounding the rise of
bureaucracy and administrative law in France and England. In France, the drive to
consolidate absolute authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was marked by
intense conflicts between the royal officers responsible for administering the provinces
(intendants) and the powerful regional courts in the hands of local elites (Parlements). In
an attempt to insulate the decisions of the intendants from interference by the Parlements,
legal oversight was entrusted to a special body directly controlled by the monarchy
(Conseil du Roi). The system of a specialized review body was borrowed during the
French Revolution, albeit motivated by a very different republican theory aimed at
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destroying the special privileges and vested interests of the Parlements of the Ancien
Régime and ensuring that government officials would not encounter resistance from the
old elites in carrying out the will of the people. Napoleon, in turn, embraced this system
with the founding of the Council of State (Conseil d’État). It was at this time that the
distinctive French separation of powers doctrine was born, according to which “to judge
the administration is still to administer” (juger l'administration c'est encore administrer):
judicial review by the ordinary courts represented an encroachment upon the executive
power and therefore oversight had to be entrusted to a specialized body connected with
the executive branch.
By contrast, in England, the business of government was handled by local elites
with relatively little central involvement until well into the nineteenth century and
appeals against government officers were heard by courts of general jurisdiction based on
the same system of common law writs devised for private disputes. Although the Stuarts
made a bid to improve royal control by creating a separate set of prerogative courts with
jurisdiction over complaints against government officers, the attempt came to end with
the victory of Parliament and the common law bar in the Revolutionary Settlement of
1688. At that time, the hated prerogative courts were abolished and the powers and
independence of common law judges were formally established by act of Parliament.
Later, when a substantial, centralized bureaucracy emerged, largely in response to
nineteenth-century industrialization, the stature of the common law was such that there
could be no question of ousting the courts and transferring administrative disputes to a
separate body.
Let us explore the common law-droit administratif difference in more detail. In
1885, the English scholar Albert Venn Dicey famously proclaimed that in England,
unlike France, there was no such thing called administrative law.7 Government officers
could be held to account for their actions, like private individuals, before the ordinary
courts of law. The same judges, applying the same rules and affording the same rights
and remedies, had the power to decide both suits against the government and purely
private disputes. Dicey argued that by treating public administration and private
individuals on the same footing, the English system did a better job of safeguarding basic
liberties and therefore was superior to the French one.
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This characterization of the English system of legal redress has been rightly
debunked as inaccurate, not only from the perspective of the law as it has evolved today
but also at the time it was pronounced. For instance, the statute of limitations for tort
actions against public officials was six months, compared to the six years for similar
actions between private parties, and was only extended by the Law Reform (Limitation of
Actions) of 1954. It is true, however, that the practice of common law adjudication did
produce a marked tendency to deny any categorical difference between public and private
law and a natural overlapping of legal concepts, writs, and forms of redress between
cases brought against private parties and those brought against the government.8 Today,
with the elaboration of numerous legal doctrines specific to administration, the creation
of a specific procedure for judicial review, the widespread resort to administrative
tribunals (explained below), and the establishment of a special section of the ordinary
courts devoted to administrative law, it is evident that even in England, administrative
law is a field apart from private law. The main vestiges of the original model that have
survived are to be found in the area of government torts and public contracts, which are
considered part of the general law of torts and contracts, and in the continuing power of
common law courts to hear, in the last resort, cases brought against the government.
In France, the Council of State (Conseil d’État) was originally established by
Napoleon. 9 Then, as now, the Council of State had the dual function of drafting
government laws and rules and hearing cases against government administration.
Originally, the Council of State’s dispute-resolution function was subject to extensive
limitations, but by the time of the Third Republic most had been abolished and the
Council of State had become a powerful and respected arbiter of complaints against the
government.
Institutionally, the critical difference between the Council of State and the judicial
branch is the system of recruitment and management of personnel, which gives rise to
pronounced cultural and sociological affinities between the Council of State and public
administration. Members of the Council of State are selected from graduates of the École
Nationale d’Administration, the elite, state-run school designed to train the uppermost
echelons of the civil service (about two-thirds) and from the ranks of experienced
individuals already serving in the administration, either in the lower administrative courts
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or in the upper ranks of the civil service (about one-third). This stands in contrast to the
judiciary, which is populated with law school graduates who receive professional training
at the state-sponsored school for the judiciary. Moreover, at any given point in time,
about one-third of the members of the Council of State are serving elsewhere in the
public administration, in ministerial cabinets, public enterprises, and other government
offices. The last distinguishing feature of the Council of State is the mix of functions
performed by its members. There are five administrative sections, responsible for giving
technical advice on legislation and regulation, and one adjudicatory section, which hears
administrative law cases, and members are commonly assigned to both an administrative
section and the adjudicatory section. It is also important to underscore what does not
separate the Council of State from the judicial branch—independence. True, members of
the Council of State, unlike the judiciary, are not formally guaranteed permanence in
office (inamovibilité), which means that in theory they can be transferred from one post
to another for any reason. In practice, however, this never occurs and it is universally
acknowledged that the Council of State enjoys the same independence from executivebranch meddling as do the courts.
Litigation in the Council of State is conceived in markedly different terms from
litigation in the ordinary courts. Traditionally, administrative litigation was understood
primarily as designed to guarantee the legality and propriety of government action in a
republican system faithful to the rule of law. In other words, administrative litigation was
perceived as serving “objective” purposes, linked to the correct working of the
bureaucracy within the overall system of government. Until recently, the “subjective”
purposes of promoting justice and safeguarding individual rights were believed to be
secondary. This has had numerous consequences for the system of administrative law
adjudication. The fact that an administrative decision takes the form of a generally
applicable regulation, affecting broad classes of individuals based on general
characteristics, is not a barrier to getting into court (standing) as in other countries, such
as Germany, England, and, in the past, the United States. Because of the focus on the
objective lawfulness of rules, any individual affected by a rule can come forward to
contest its correctness. Another consequence of this stylization of administrative
adjudication was, until recently, a fairly meek system of judicial remedies. Before 1980,
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the Council of State could annul offending administrative acts but it did not have the
procedural tools necessary to force administration to come into compliance and guarantee
that victorious litigants would obtain relief from wrongful government action. Since the
1980s, however, the Council of State has gradually acquired a better remedial toolkit,
first with the power to fine non-compliant administration (astreinte), then with the power
to issue injunctions (injonction), and finally with the power to grant temporary
injunctions (référé).
Mirroring the institutional separation between the judiciary and the Council of
State, the study and doctrinal elaboration of administrative law in France is marked by a
self-conscious divide between public and private law. In public law thinking, state
administration is granted extraordinary privileges (the prerogatives of the puissance
publique) but is also subject to extensive duties designed to safeguard the rights and
interests of citizens. One clear example of this is the important concept of “public
service.”10 The notion of public service was invented to cover any state activity
performed in the general interest, not simply the core functions of policing and defense.
Once a government activity is classified as a “public service,” the state is empowered to
take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the continuity of that service and
adaptation to changing circumstances, but it is also under a duty to treat the citizen-users
of the public service equally and neutrally. To ensure continuity and adaptability, the
administration is permitted to unilaterally modify government contracts with private
providers but it is also required to compensate the provider for any loss suffered as a
consequence.
Linked to this understanding of the special concerns of public law is the sweeping
scope of the field. In contrast with common law systems like the United States, where
public contracts and government liability are taught as specialty subjects and are omitted
from most administrative law textbooks, in the French tradition, state liability and
government contracts are integral to the discipline. The theoretical apparatus of
government privileges and duties at the core of administrative law extends to all forms of
administrative action and all attempts to obtain individual redress from government
wrongs. As many have observed, however, public law is coming to borrow more and
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more from private law and therefore, even in France, public contracts and governmental
liability are losing some of their distinctiveness.11
An alternative that has emerged to the English and French models of judicial
review is that of a specialized branch of the judiciary dedicated to hearing administrative
law cases. 12 The first example is generally taken to be Germany. There the judicial
branch is composed of the Federal Constitutional Court and five discrete judicial
hierarchies, one for civil and criminal law, one for labor disputes, one for tax disputes,
one for social security disputes, and one for administrative law disputes. The latter three
all handle variants of what would be called administrative law cases in other countries.
The judges that serve on the tax, social security, and administrative law courts are
recruited based on the same system of university study, exams, and traineeships as their
counterparts on other courts and share the same, identical guarantee of independence.
The only difference is the degree of specialization and familiarity that the members of
these three branches acquire with administrative disputes.
The systems in this third category operate closer to the common law model than
the French one. In Germany as well as other countries that have chosen to adopt a
specialized judiciary, government contract and tort disputes are heard by the civil courts,
not by the administrative courts, and the doctrine tracks the private law of contract and
tort. Moreover, administrative litigation is designed to protect individual rights and
interests, much as private law litigation, and therefore the conditions under which
standing is granted are more limited than in French law while, at the same time, the
remedial powers of courts are broader.
Most legal systems have adopted one of these three institutional models.
Histories of colonial rule can go some way in explaining the patterns that we see today.
The territories that were part of the British Empire and that adopted the common law
have entrusted generalist courts with hearing disputes between individuals and public
administration. These include Australia, New Zealand, India, Ireland, and the United
States. Due to the influence of American law after World War II, a number of other
countries have adopted the generalist court model, including Japan and South Korea.
Countries influenced by France in the 1800s and the first half of the 1900s today have
Councils of State that operate separate from the judiciary. These include Belgium, the
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Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Colombia, Morocco,
Algeria, and Senegal.13 However, the label can be deceptive, since some of these
Councils of State only have policymaking powers (e.g., Luxembourg) and some only
have powers of adjudication and are housed within the generalist court of last resort for
civil and criminal disputes (e.g., Morocco, Algeria, Senegal). Moreover, unlike the
French model, jurisdiction over government liability cases in Belgium, Italy, and the
Netherlands is vested in the courts, not the Council of State, on the liberal theory that the
ordinary courts are better placed to protect property and other rights against oppressive
state action. It appears that the system of a specialized, administrative law branch of the
judiciary, illustrated above with the German case, is even more widespread that the other
two models: it has been adopted in Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic,
Poland , Spain, Switzerland, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, and most of Latin
America.

3.2. Principles of administrative action
3.2.1. Procedural principles
Traditionally, one of the differences that separated the common law from
continental legal systems was its reliance on procedural principles of fair play in judging
the correctness of administrative action. 14 The common law tended to equate important
categories of administrative action with the adjudication of courts and to require
analogous procedural safeguards. By contrast, the administrative law of continental
Europe was more focused on the substantive correctness of administrative decisions in
deciding whether to let them stand.15 In English law, this procedural emphasis was
encapsulated by the principle of natural justice, which included the right to be heard and
the right to an impartial adjudicator, also known as the rule against bias. In American
law, these same guarantees have been developed in the constitutional case law on
procedural due process. Although the French Council of State began fashioning
procedural requirements for government administration as far back as 1944, with a line of
cases on the “rights of the defense” (droits de la défense), these rights were more limited
than their common law counterparts: they generally excluded rights to an oral hearing
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and the disclosure of documents and they only applied to those administrative decisions
that were cast as imposing sanctions.
Since the 1970s, however, this common law-continental law difference has faded.
A number of national laws guarantee individuals, in the context of an individualized
administrative determination, the right to receive notice of the proposed decision, to
examine the supporting documents, to respond in writing, and to receive a statement of
reasons with the final decision. These include French laws of July 11, 1979 and April 12,
2000, the Italian law of August 7, 1990, the Swedish Administrative Procedure Act of
1986, and the Danish Public Administration Act of 1985. The German case is somewhat
exceptional in that the proceduralization of individual decisionmaking began immediately
in the post-war period, under the heavy influence of constitutional law, and was
eventually codified with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1977. Spain is
another interesting case: Already in 1889, notice and hearing procedures for licensing,
procurement, and other types of individualized decisions were set down in the Spanish
Administrative Procedure Act. A number of countries in Latin America and East Asia
have also adopted administrative procedure laws: Peru in 1972, Argentina in 1973,
Costa Rica in 1978, Columbia in 1984, Japan in 1993, and South Korea in 1995.16
Notwithstanding this common trend, at least one important difference remains.
Common law countries have institutionalized the judicial model within the administrative
process to a greater extent than other legal systems. In Britain and Australia this takes
the shape of administrative tribunals, while in the United States it comes under the
heading of “formal adjudication,” governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and
handled by administrative law judges.17 Administrative tribunals and administrative law
judges are responsible for hearing appeals from social security determinations,
immigration decisions, and other high-volume regulatory areas and their decisions are
subject to judicial review on points of law before the ordinary courts. They are formally
part of government administration even though they enjoy significant statutory
guarantees of independence and their decisionmaking procedure is modeled after the
courtroom. This institutionalization of dispute resolution stands in contrast with
continental bureaucracies, where there is generally a right of appeal up the chain-of-
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command to administrative superiors, but where the main opportunity for an independent
hearing is in judicial review before a full-fledged court.

3.2.2. Substantive principles
In reviewing the substance of an administrative decision to ban a product on
safety grounds, to deny a building permit for a supermarket, or to accomplish one of the
thousands of other purposes of bureaucracy, what criteria do courts use?18 A multitude of
doctrinal headings are used by courts to examine the substance of administrative
decisions and decide whether or not to let them stand. Nevertheless, the intervention of
courts in the activity of bureaucracy can be seen to fall under three distinct headings: rule
of law, individual rights, and policy rationality. In the section below, I explore the local
expressions of these judicial review practices and discuss the important variations in how
and the extent to which these powers are exercised.
Much judicial review is geared towards furthering the rule of law, understood as
the principle of a government of laws and not of men.19 Public administration must
respect the purposes and limits set down in laws—generally passed by parliaments, but
also, in some places executive decrees—or turn into the arbitrary action of tyrannical
despots. The task of courts is to enforce those limits. To understand the pervasiveness
of this understanding of the relationship between courts and the bureaucracy, it suffices to
peruse the main types of challenges contemplated in the administrative law of France, the
United States, and England. Administrative acts can be overturned in France in the case
of “incompetence” or a “violation of the law,”20 in the United States, if they are “in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”21 and
in England if the court finds an “error of law”22 or “illegality.”23 Thus to take an example
from American administrative law, in 2000, the Supreme Court struck a regulation of the
Food and Drug Administration severely restricting the sale and advertising of tobacco
products on the grounds that the statute under which the government was acting could
only be interpreted to give it authority over medical drugs, not tobacco.24 The same
challenge would be styled as incompetence or a violation of law in France and an error of
law or illegality in England.
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A second type of substantive review of administrative action is the protection of
basic liberties against government action. This was true even in the absence of a written
bill of rights enforceable by the courts, as was the case in most countries until the 1950s,
given the importance of property rights in both the common law and civil law codes.
With the spread of written constitutions in the twentieth century, as well as international
human rights instruments, in particular the European Convention of Human Rights, the
catalogue of rights that courts are expected to defend against administrative action has
expanded: freedom of expression and association, the right to privacy and human dignity,
personal liberty, the right to engage in the trades, and much more. All of these rights can
be readily breached by the decisions of immigration authorities, social security agencies,
licensing boards, and other government bodies and they are commonly invoked before
the courts.
On this aspect of judicial review, let us dwell on Germany for a moment, where
fundamental rights guarantees are particularly pervasive and administrative law has been
thoroughly constitutionalized, more so than in other European systems and the United
States. The most conspicuous sign of this is probably the declaration, made in 1959 by
the President of the Federal Administrative Court, that administrative law is “concretised
constitutional law” (konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht).26 The German courts have
developed a number of cross-cutting principles that are designed to limit administrative
action to the benefit of individual liberties. Three in particular bear mention:
proportionality, equality, and legitimate expectations.
Any measure that interferes with a right must satisfy a proportionality test. In this
sequential inquiry, the government must demonstrate that the measure is capable of
achieving the declared public ends; that it is necessary to achieve those ends and that no
other, equally effective and less rights-restrictive measures are available for
accomplishing the same purposes; and that the public benefit from the measure outweighs
the burden to the individual right. Thus, for instance, in the domain of administrative
sanctions, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that the forfeiture of unemployment
benefits for two weeks, in response to the recipient’s failure to notify regularly the public
employment office of his employment status, was disproportionate. To take another
example, in 1958, the Constitutional Court declared a restriction on the number of
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pharmacies a disproportionate interference with the right to freely choose one’s
profession. The German courts engage in a similar inquiry when administrative
programs are challenged due to alleged discrimination based on economic or other
characteristics: under the equality principle “[d]ifferences must be of such a kind and
weight so as to justify a differentiation.”27 And the principle of legitimate expectations,
the rough equivalent of the duty of non-retroactivity and the protection of reliance
interests in the United States, and derived in Germany from the rule of law and the right
to freedom of action, significantly limits the ability of public administration to reverse
benefit-conferring determinations. As a result of this legal doctrine, beneficiaries of
public programs involving agricultural subsidies, housing benefits, and other types of
entitlements have a right to significant notice (generally one year) or compensation
before the government may alter the terms of the program or withdraw a benefit
improperly granted.28
These rights, albeit with numerous modifications and with significant differences
in judicial practice, have gone on to influence the case law of the European Court of
Justice and other European legal systems.29 The constitutionalization of European
administrative law stands in marked contrast with the United States, where the Supreme
Court is highly deferential to government action that burdens the economic rights
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.30 These are the very
rights that are most commonly implicated by administrative determinations yet so-called
“rational basis” review under the Fourteenth Amendment is a tremendously lenient
standard when compared to the principles of proportionality and equality in German law.
The last form of judicial review of administrative action is review for policy
rationality. Doctrinally, rationality review picks up where legality review leaves off:
when controlling legislation does not contain standards to guide administrative action and
thus effectively leaves decisionmaking to bureaucratic discretion, the courts nonetheless
can evaluate administrative action based on criteria related to sound policymaking.
Doctrinal expressions of this form of review give the impression that only acts of
confirmed insanity will be struck by the courts: review for “arbitrary and capricious”
decisionmaking in the United States31 and review for “manifest error of assessment”
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(erreur manifeste d’appréciation) in France.32 Even better is the English articulation of
the principle:
By “irrationality” I mean what can now be succinctly referred to
“Wednesbury unreasonableness”.... It applies to a decision which is so
outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided
could have arrived at it....33
In the United States, however, arbitrary and capricious review has become a
demanding test, and, indeed, it has come to represent a distinctive feature of the
American administrative law system. It became common judicial practice in the late
1960s and the 1970s and was associated with the fall of the post-war consensus on
economic growth, growing distrust in technologies and government, new social
movements such as the environment and civil rights, and the spread of public interest
lawyering. The Supreme Court’s statement in State Farm remains the emblematic
articulation of arbitrary and capricious review of administrative policymaking in
American law:

the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’ . . . Normally, an agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. .
. . 34
In State Farm, the Supreme Court struck an administrative decision revoking a
passenger-safety rule requiring automobiles to be fitted with automatic seatbelts or
airbags. It found that the tests and studies in the agency’s record did not support a
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determination that the rule would fail to produce safety benefits and it faulted the agency
for failing to consider other policy options for ensuring passenger safety, namely an
airbag-only rule.
Although European rights-based proportionality review and American arbitrary
and capricious review overlap in some respects, their essence is fundamentally different.
In the former, the focus is on the individual right and the decision to overturn the
administrative act turns on an assessment of the importance of the right as compared to
the public purpose as well as the ability of the administration to articulate a close
connection between the government measure and the public purpose. In the latter, the
focus is on the quality of the science and policymaking assessments behind the
administrative decision and the ability of the government to justify its chosen course of
action in the face of alternative scientific evidence and policy options put forward by its
opponents.

4. Administration and Organized Interests
In the conventional image of public administration, bureaucrats and courts are the
main protagonists. State officials deploy their considerable expertise and technical
prowess to accomplish public purposes and courts watch over them to ensure that they
stay within the four corners of the law. The role of social and economic groups in
administrative governance has traditionally been ignored in legal scholarship, largely
because the theories of democracies used to legitimate administration cast elections,
representative assemblies, and independent courts as the primary agents of democracy
and tend to regard interest groups with suspicion.
A growing literature, however, now recognizes that many elements of
administrative law are designed to enable social and economic actors to inform and
participate in administrative governance and that the legitimacy of administration rests as
much on accountability to civil society as it does on judicial review and legislative
oversight.35 Industry associations, trade unions, professional associations, environmental
and consumer groups, and various other actors are routinely called upon to advise on
government rulemaking, manage public programs, and engage directly in standard-setting
and rule-enforcement through powers of self-regulation. Due to space constraints, this
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section will address only one of these forms of administrative law: the procedures that
empower social and economic groups to participate in government rulemaking.
A distinctive feature of American administrative law is what is known as noticeand-comment rulemaking. Before administrative agencies decide on the new policies
contained in government rules—for instance, worker-safety standards for coal mines,
maximum chemical concentrations for drinking water, and consumer protection rules for
the banking industry—they must first give notice of the proposed rule, allow the public
an opportunity to comment on the rule, and respond to any objections in a “concise
general statement” explaining the rationale for the rule.36 If commenters are disappointed
with the final result, they may go to court. Besides reviewing the rule on the substantive
grounds discussed in the previous section, the court will also decide whether the agency
adequately responded to the public comments or, if no such procedure was held, whether
the administration was correct in deciding that one of the exceptions to the requirement of
notice-and-comment rulemaking applied. Thus notice-and-comment rulemaking
significantly limits administrative discretion, both on when and whom to consult and on
what weight, if any, to give to objections from the regulated community. Although
notice-and-comment rulemaking is formally open to anyone, a number of studies have
found that, in practice, organized interests and market actors are the main participants,
both because of the resources necessary to respond convincingly to administrative
proposals and, in the event of defeat, call the administration to task before the courts, and
because of the broad-reaching and abstract nature of the policy being decided, which
rarely prompts action from individual citizens.37
Notice-and-comment rulemaking was first introduced in 1946, with the adoption
of the Administrative Procedure Act. It was then amplified in the 1960s and 1970s by a
series of court decisions that required administration to alert the public to all aspects of a
proposed rule and to give careful consideration to public comments in the administrative
statement supporting the final rule.38 This judicial turn was driven by the sense that
administration had been “captured” by industry actors and that public interest groups,
which were rapidly proliferating at the time, should be guaranteed an equally prominent
role in the policymaking process. 39 The original creation and subsequent development of
notice-and-comment rulemaking reflects what, in the political science literature, is known
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as the American system of pluralist interest representation.40 In the theoretical stylization
of pluralism, multiple organizations, representing a variety of different interests, compete
to influence government decisions in what, formally speaking, is a policymaking process
open to all and government officials seek to neutrally mediate among these diverse
interests. Pluralist thinkers like Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Robert Dahl saw
immense democratic promise in this system of interest group competition because they
believed that government decisions would reflect the entire range of interests at play in
the nation rather than cater to any one group or set of groups. Of course, as many have
observed, this positive assessment rests on a number of often questionable assumptions—
that all groups are equally capable of mobilizing, that all organizations have the resources
necessary to participate in the political process, and that government officials
mechanically responding to self-regarding interests, even a wide variety of interests, is a
process capable of generating morally worthy government policies.41 Nevertheless, the
theory and practice of pluralism is extremely powerful in American politics and is
reflected and perpetuated by legal procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.
By contrast, in Europe, the favorite device for obtaining outside advice on
government rules is the civil society committee. Established by law, these committees
are composed of representatives of the major organizations active in the policy area and
are generally chaired by a government bureaucrat. Their consultation can be either
mandatory or optional, depending on the policy area and the type of government
proposal, and they often also exercise powers of proposal. In France, Italy, the European
Union, and other legal systems, there are hundreds of these committees in areas as
diverse as welfare and industrial policy, consumer policy, environmental policy, and
equal protection. To give but one example, in France, the High Council on Professional
Equality Between Men and Women gives advice on new equal protection initiatives and
is composed of nine members of the administration, nine members selected by the five
major national trade unions, nine members chosen by a variety of employer
organizations, and nine policy experts and representatives of women’s rights
organizations selected by the responsible government ministry. In committees such as
the French High Council, the organizations entitled to comment on government policies
are the handful mentioned in the enabling legislation or tapped by the administration to
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sit on the committee, and therefore influence over policymaking is more restricted than in
notice-and-comment rulemaking, as it is limited to those groups that have established
themselves as reputable and powerful members of the regulatory community. Moreover,
unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is mandatory for most forms of
administrative rulemaking, consultation of civil society committees is often entirely
within the discretion of public administration. And finally, while American officials
must reply meticulously to comments or risk being sued, their European counterparts are
not legally required to respond in any particular fashion to the comments and proposals
authored by such committees.
It is certainly true that, today, European regulators also stage broad-based
consultations, using the possibilities afforded by the internet to make their policy
proposals widely known and to solicit the reactions of all those organizations that care to
comment. 42 Therefore the privileged access of the past through the committee system
has been attenuated somewhat through the use of new technologies. However, in contrast
with American notice-and-comment rulemaking, these consultations are permeated by
administrative discretion, both in the decision to call them in the first place and
subsequently, in the decision on what kind of response, if any, to give to public
opposition. Regulators, therefore, are still in a strong position to control access to the
policymaking process.
The institution of the civil society committee is rooted in the theory and politics of
what, in the political science literature, is known as neo-corporatism.43 In many
European countries, producer groups are represented by a few, all-encompassing and
broadly representative labor unions, employer associations, farmer groups, and
professional associations and these organizations are given an essential role in the
policymaking process. As politics have changed and non-material interests have become
more prominent, this model of all-encompassing organizations and privileged access has
been extended to environmental and consumer protection groups, human rights
organizations, and other types of associations. Neo-corporatist political theory portrayed
the state and society as intertwined: public administration would nurture the many
producer organizations upon which social cohesion and economic prosperity depended
and, in turn, those producer groups would be entitled to influence the policies of the state.
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These ideas were developed in the law by thinkers such as Harold Laski in England, Otto
von Gierke in Germany, Léon Duguit and Maurice Hauriou in France, and Santi Romano
in Italy and stand in marked contrast with the portrayal of interest group politics as
conflictual and government actors as passive arbiters in pluralist theories of democracy.

5. Administration and the Public
In a number of administrative law systems, informal, broad-ranging public
oversight has become critical to the legitimacy of bureaucracy. Although this form of
diffuse accountability is achieved through a wide range of legal tools and institutional
arrangements, two are particularly prominent: ombudsmen appointed by parliaments with
oversight and complaint-resolution functions and laws guaranteeing all citizens a right of
access to government documents. Sweden is generally believed to be the first Western
legal system to have established an ombudsman and freedom of information. There the
expansion of parliamentary power and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy
was accompanied by the passage of the Law on Liberty of the Press (1766, re-enacted in
1809), abolishing censorship and giving a right of public access to government
documents, and the creation of a parliamentary ombudsman (1809). For a long time,
Sweden stood out as an anomaly, but beginning in the 1970s, momentum got underway
in a number of countries for broader public accountability in government administration
and today a vast array of legal systems have freedom-of-information laws and
ombudsmen.
Ombudsmen share a number of characteristics.44 They are institutionally linked
to parliaments, not the executive branch, by virtue of the fact that they are appointed by
parliament, generally for a fixed term, and are legally obligated to report periodically to
parliament on their activities. The principal function of ombudsmen is to settle
complaints filed by members of the public against the bureaucracy. The process is
informal, in that a simple letter or online complaint form is sufficient to trigger an
investigation and the grounds for complaining are extremely broad—anything linked to
maladministration—and do not need to be styled as one of the grounds for obtaining legal
redress in the courts. “The public officer was extremely rude” or “I never received an
answer to the query that I filed with the tax office” is enough to warrant a response from
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the ombudsman.45 The ombudsman system, therefore, offers the promise of redress to
individuals without the resources to go to court and in circumstances that fail to meet the
stringent legal criteria that have been developed by courts to make a successful claim
against the administration.
Once the ombudsman comes to a decision on a complaint, the powers of the
office are limited compared to courts. The ombudsman cannot order civil servants to
comply with his or her decision but rather must rely on bureaucratic good will and the
threat of bad press and public embarrassment to induce compliance.46 The triangular
relationship between the ombudsman, the press, and parliament is critical to ensuring the
effectiveness of the institution. The threat of public censure and hostile parliamentary
questions is the main tool in the ombudsman’s arsenal and underscores the diffuse public
accountability inherent in this area of administrative law. Ombudsmen in Sweden,
France, Denmark and many other countries are also involved in policymaking and
regularly recommend changes to administrative law and practice to bring administration
into line with rule of law ideals and fundamental rights guarantees.
Laws on the right of access to public documents also broaden public oversight of
administration.47 The right to government documents expands public scrutiny by giving
individuals a right to examine the decisions of government even absent a claim of having
been wronged or having a particular interest in the matter. Simply by virtue of being a
citizen, individuals are assumed to have a stake in the correct workings of their
government and are entitled to request government documents without having to put
forward a justification for their request. Freedom-of-information laws, however, also
restrict the types of documents that are accessible. For instance, documents filed with
government by industry and containing commercial secrets and documents related to
national security are either excluded from the right of access or subject to extensive
redaction before they may be released to the public. Preliminary drafts, notes, and
memoranda are entirely exempted from disclosure in Sweden and Denmark if they are
not circulated outside the responsible government agency and are exempted until the
relevant government decision becomes final in Finland and the United States. These
laws also differ in how they organize access to documents: an official register of
government documents, open to public consultation, exists in Sweden, Finland, and the
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European Union, but not in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States, where
petitioners must designate the issue of interest and trust the responding agency to locate
the relevant documents.
Both ombudsmen and freedom-of-information laws have been popular over the
past decades. In Europe, Finland (1919), Denmark (1954), Britain (1967), France (1973),
Spain (1981), the Netherlands (1984), Ireland (1984), Portugal (1991), and Romania
(1991) have established ombudsmen at the national level, and other countries, like
Germany and Italy, have established them at the regional level. New Zealand (1962),
Hong Kong (1989), and Korea (1994) are examples of other countries with parliamentary
ombudsmen. As for freedom of information, according to one study, almost seventy
countries throughout the world have adopted the necessary legislation.48
These overviews give an idea not only of the extent of diffuse public
accountability as a feature of administrative law, but also of the remaining variations.
Legal systems still differ in the degree to which individuals seek formal recognition of
their grievances through the courts or rely mostly on informal avenues of redress through
ombudsmen. In some countries, parliamentary ombudsmen are absent, as in the United
States and Germany (at the federal level), and in others, the ombudsman system is
considered ineffective. By contrast, in countries like Sweden and Denmark, the informal
administrative justice offered by ombudsmen is immensely popular and tends to function
as a substitute for courts. Freedom-of-information laws also have not taken root
everywhere. Just in Europe, Italy and Greece are notable exceptions to the trend.

6. The Globalization of Administrative Law
This discussion would be incomplete without mention of the accelerating
diffusion of administrative principles among legal systems, spurred by the forces of
globalization. Traditionally one of the reasons that public law was said to be the poor
cousin of private law in comparative studies was that public law was too idiosyncratic
and contingent on domestic politics and national history for comparison to yield any
fruitful insights. There is no doubt that administrative law is profoundly shaped by
distinct national experiences with state formation. Today, however, the rise of a liberal
consensus and the growing power of international organizations have prompted political
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actors in a variety of jurisdictions to adopt a common set of good governance reforms
involving administrative procedures and principles of judicial review. Therefore, at least
on the books, administrative law appears to be converging.
Transparency, where the last section ended, is a good example of the globalization
phenomenon. As explained earlier, legislation on the right of access to government
documents was first adopted in Sweden in 1766 and it was immediately copied in
Finland, which at the time was a Swedish colony. Two hundred years later, it still was
limited to those two countries. Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States and a
handful of other European countries adopted freedom-of-information legislation. In
1993, the European Union followed suit, obliging not only its own institutions to hand
over documents to the public, but also putting heavy pressure on all of its member
countries to do the same. Since then, the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, and a number of other international organizations have urged their member
countries to adopt freedom-of-information laws. By 2006, one survey found that nearly
seventy countries had such laws and an additional fifty countries were in the process of
drafting them.49 And according to a recent analysis, the many transnational and
international regulatory authorities that have sprung up over the past decades also have
made commitments to transparency.50 In sum, since the 1990s, the right of access to
government documents has become a commonplace of public life and this is due in no
small measure to the growing influence of international bodies in world politics.
One of the main challenges facing comparative law scholars today is to
understand the operation, utility, and ultimately, desirability of these common procedures
and principles in the multiple legal settings in which they now exist. To do so, it is
necessary for comparative scholarship to move beyond the traditional national focus and
to recognize the growing importance of international legal systems as objects of study in
their own right and as catalysts for change at the domestic level. At bottom, however,
comparative law is well equipped to handle this new task. It requires a deep appreciation
of the historical diversity of national legal traditions and a familiarity with the many ways
in which legal transplants can be transformed in the process of migration from one place
to another. These are concerns that have traditionally been at the heart of comparative
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law scholarship and that offer an essential platform for coming to grips with
globalization.
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